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ABSTRACT

REVISTING CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND
THE VALUE OF CASH

By

Nan Guo, Master of Science
Utah State University,2018

Major Professor: Jason Smith
Department: Financail Economics

Corporate financial policy and the value of cash by Michael Faulkender and Rong
Wang (2006) examined the cross sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash
holdings that arises from differences in the corporate financial policy. The main findings
were that the marginal value of cash declines with large cash holdings,higher leverage, and
better access to capital market. The goal of this paper is to replicate and extend Faulkender
& Wang's (2006) work to test whether their assumptions and results are still valid.

1. Introduction

Liquidity measures a company’s ability to obtain the cash and meet the cash
requirements at any time. To minimize liquidity risks, the firm needs to hold a certain
amount of cash. Cash is the most liquid asset, but also the least profitable. On one hand,
with high liquidity of cash assets, firm need to hold a certain amount of cash to ensure the
basic needs of the company's production and business activities are met and to lower the
firms’ financial risks. On the other hand, with the lowest profitability, there are high
opportunity costs to hold the cash. Therefore, maintaining the proper level of cash holdings
is becoming one of the most important goals pursued by the company.
Different levels of cash holdings affect companies’ financing decisions. In a perfect market
(Miller, 1958), firms can obtain the investment funds from the capital market at the same
cost as internal funds and, the level of cash holdings is irrelevant to the value of the firm
(Opler,1999). However, due to the existence of market frictions, such as information
asymmetry and agency problems in the real capital market, the perfect capital market
assumptions generally do not hold, implying that the level of cash holdings do have impact
on the value of the company. This paper, we replicate and extend the work on “Corporate
Financial Policy and the Value of Cash” written by Michael Faulkender and Rong Wang. By
examining the annual excess return of the firm over the fiscal year, Faulkender and Wang
found that “the marginal value of cash for the firms declines with larger cash holdings, higher
leverage, and better access to capital markets.” (Faulkender & Wang,2006) Our paper hopes

to find identical results by using the same research methods but different data time frames
and a new measurement of the financial constraints.

2.

Literature Review

2.1. Influencing Factors on Level of Cash Holdings
By examining the firm characteristics that affect the level of cash holdings, Kim et al.
(1998) found that firm size, growth opportunities, and the volatility of earnings correlates
with the level of cash holdings. Almeida et al. (2004) further researched a large sample of
1026 manufacturing firms from 1971 to 2000 to “estimate the effects of financial constraints
on the corporate financial policy.” They analyzed the differences in cash flow sensitivities on
the level of cash holdings and the financial status of the firm. They found that financially
constrained firms have a higher level of cash reserves and sensitivity of the cash flow of the
money. Thus, growth opportunities, firm size, the level of leverage, and the financial
constraints are all the crucial factors that affect company’s cash holdings.

2.2. Cash Holdings and Firm Value
Scholars have extensively researched the theories of cash holdings and their effects on
the value of the firm. For the supporters, they think that holding a certain amount of cash is
an act that can increase the value of the company because the costs for the firms to raise the
external funds are high. Modigliani and Miller (1958) thought that in a perfect capital market,
we could consider the external funds as ideal alternatives to the internal funding. Therefore,

the amount of one dollar of cash holding is equivalent to a dollar of the company value.
However, when many friction factors exist in actual capital market, the situations are
different.
Myers and Majluf (1984) found that because of the information asymmetry that exists
in the capital market, the costs for external financing are much higher than internal financing.
Thus, for firms that use external financing for their investment will lose certain investment
opportunities due to increased capital costs caused by asymmetric information, and
corporate value will therefore be reduced. On the contrary, if companies have sufficient cash,
they do not need external financing to meet their investment needs, and they can avoid the
loss of corporate value caused by financial constraints.
However, some hold a negative opinion regarding the effects of level of cash holdings
on the value of the firm. Because of agency costs, the opponents think that the primary goal
for the managers is to hold a significant amount of cash within the company is to meet their
private interests. Harford (1999) further argued that the cash-rich companies are also more
likely to conduct some diminishing value mergers and acquisitions, mainly reflected in the
decline of the stock prices and companies’ operating performance. Thus, the value of the cash
holdings may less than its par value.
Different from positive or negative opinions, some scholars also believe that the
effects that the cash holdings have on the value of the firms cannot be generalized. It is also
influenced by corporate governance, growth opportunities, and information asymmetry.
Wang Donghong and Wang Haigang (2008) found the relationship between the cash holdings

and corporate values are inversed U shaped. When the amount of cash holding is small, the
information asymmetry theory plays a leading role. Holding a certain amount of cash is
beneficial to increasing the shareholders' price. However, when the amount of cash holdings
increases to a certain level, the agency problem arises, which will cause the company's value
to decline.
For this paper, we replicated the article written by Faulkender and Wang (2006).
From shareholder’s perspective, we analyzed the value of the marginal cash holdings and
the changes in cash values with respect to the corporate capital structures.

Since the

liquidity of the assets can have a significant impact on company's financial decisions and the
firm's value, we need to pay more attention to the problem that Faulkender and Wang
studies.

3. Research Design

According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), there are three factors that affect the value
shareholders placed on firm’s additional cash holdings: The level of cash positions, the
degree of leverage, and the financial constraints. In this paper, we borrowed the research
method and research process from Faulkender and Wang (2006), but we changed our data
time frame from 1971-2001 to 2001-2013 and applied a new definition of the financial
constraints –the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce,2010) to test whether the results and
assumptions made by Faulkender and Wang (2006) will still stand.

3.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), from the perspective of the equity
shareholders, the value of one extra dollar of cash may be different depending on the ways
that the firm used for this cash. They categorized these into three types: “Distributing Cash ,
Serving Debt or other Liabilities, and Raising Cash.
For the company that belongs to the cash distribution type, taxes and the agency problem
due to “the free cash flow” (Jensen (1986)) will affect one firm’s value of the cash holdings .
In general, the corporate tax rate on earned interests of cash is higher than the individual tax
rate, which implies that it is better to have investors other than the company to hold the
additional cash. Therefore, the marginal value of cash of the firm decreases as the level of
its’ cash holdings increases. On the other hand, Jensen (1986) argued that because agency
problems exist, managers for cash-rich industries are more likely to abuse their power on
their own private interests, which in turns decreases the marginal value of the cash. Borrowed
from Faulkender and Wang (2006), we have our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The marginal value of cash decreases with the level of firm’s cash
holdings increases
For the company that has high leverage ratios, Jensen (1986) point out that the
introduction of risky debt into the company will cause a proxy conflict between shareholders
and creditors. For the debt holders, they care about the safety of their capitals and the fixed
rate of return on their investment. For the equity shareholders, they prefer to invest risky
items that could bring them the higher rate of return. However, holding the cash provides

safety but also the least profitable investment. For the firm that experiences financial
difficulties but also has high leveraged ratios, the additional cash holdings are more likely go
into debtholders hands. Therefore, from equity shareholders perspective, the marginal value
of cash will decrease as the level of leverage increase. Borrowed from Faulkender and Wang,
we have our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The marginal value of the additional dollar of cash decreases with the
level of leverage increasing
For firms that have high financial constraints, Fazzari et al. (1988) showed that the
investment expenditures for the firms would change with the availability of their internal
funds. Because of the high transaction costs and information asymmetry faced by financial
constraints firms to access the external financing, the marginal value of an additional dollar
of cash is often higher than non-financial constraints firms, especially for the financial firms
that have high investment opportunities. Thus, borrowed for Faulkender and Wang, we have
our last assumptions:
Hypothesis 3: From the perspective of equity shareholders, the marginal value of an
additional dollar of cash is higher for financially constrained firms

3.2 Research Methodology
For this replication paper, we examined the marginal value of cash of the firm and how it
will be affected by corporates ‘characteristics. The basis start point is: if equity shareholders

think the extra money will save the firm's high external financing costs, they will overestimate
its value. However, if the equity shareholders think that the cash holdings of the firm will
cause the agency problems, or the money will go into debtholders hands, they will
underestimate its value. Therefore, based on Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) research
process, we estimate the effects of the stock returns with respected to the changes in cash
positions.

3.3 Description of Model and Variables
We use the same model that Faulkender and Wang (2006) used to examine the
relationship between corporate financial characteristics and the marginal value of cash. The
dependent variable is stock’s excess return, which equals the stock return of firm i over
fiscal year t minus the annual benchmark return that the stock belongs to. The explanatory
variables are the variables that can reflect corporate financial characteristics. The details are
as follows: Cash and its equivalents (C), Interest expenses ( I ), earnings (E), Paid dividends
(D), Leverage (L), Net Financing (NF), R&D expenditures (RD), and Net Assets (NA). All the
variables (except for L) are deflated and lagged by the market value of equity. Thus, the
coefficients of the changes in cash holdings stand for the differences in equity value. We
used the OLS regression method to estimate the following regression model:

3.4

Construction of the benchmark portfolio
Fama and French (1992) found that firm sizes and the BE/ME ratio can explain average

variations of the stock returns. Thus, to calculate the excess return, first, we used Fama
French 25 portfolios formed on size and BE/ME portfolios as our benchmark portfolios. Then
in every fiscal year, we used ME breakpoints and BE/ME breakpoints from Ken French's data
library to sort our samples separately and get a total of 25 standard groups. Last, since the
Fama French 25 portfolio has a value-weighted monthly returns, we “calculated the
benchmark return by annualizing the monthly returns from the portfolio it belongs to each
month (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).

3.5

Introduction of the interaction terms
According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), we include two interaction terms to

interpret the effects of the changes in cash holdings with respect to the level of cash
holdings and leverages. If Faulkender and Wang’s hypothesis is correct, we should expect
the coefficients on these two interaction terms are negative. The marginal value of cash

should decrease as the level of cash holdings increases. Also, the marginal value of cash
should decrease as the level of firm’s leverage increases.

3.6

Sample Composition
In this replication paper, the data comes from CompStat database over the 2001-

2013 period.
By using the same data collection method as Faulkender and Wang, we exclude all
financial and utility firms (SIC codes 6000 - 6999, and 4900-4999). To avoid the extreme data
impact the results, we winsorize all the variables at 1% tails. We also delete the data that has
negative net assets, market value of equity and dividend paid. Our final sample consist of
70,283 firm-years. The definition of related variables and measurement description are
shown in the following table.

[Insert table 1 here]

3.7

Grouping Method for FC and NFC Firms
Following Almeida et al. (2004), We choose three main methods to group our

samples and check the financial constraints of the firms.
First, payout ratio. The payout ratio equals the total dividend (total common
dividends plus repurchases) over earnings (earnings before extraordinary items plus interest,
deferred tax credits and investment tax credits). We sort the firms based on their annual
payout ratio year by year. The firm with annual payout ratio less than 30 percentile of samples’

annual payout ratio distribution is regarded as the financially constrained firms. The firm with
annual payout ratio greater than 70 percentile of samples’ annual payout ratio distribution is
regarded as the unconstrained firms.
Second, the total assets. Due to the issue of popularity, large companies are more
likely to raise funds in the capital market than small companies. Thus, the large firms have
low financial constraints compared with small firms. In Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) paper,
they use the sales as the measurement of the size, for the robustness check, in this paper, we
use the total assets as the measurement of the firm size. We rank all the firms based on their
total assets each year. The firms with total annual assets less than 30 percentile of sample’s
annual total assets distribution is regarded as financially constrained firm. On the other hand,
the firm with total assets greater than 70 percentile of sample’s total asset is unconstrained
firms.
Third, the Size-Age index. Researchers created a lot of ways to measure financial
constraints. However, those methods depend on endogenous financial variables rather than
directly measure the financial constraints. Thus, it will cause the results of our studies biased.
In 2010, followed the ideas proposed by Kaplan and Zinglas (1997), Hadlock and Pierce
redesigned a new financial constrained indicators-the size-age index. The SA index is
calculated as follows: SA= (-0.737)*Size+0.043*Size^2-0.040*Age^2. , where size is the
natural” log inflation adjusted book assets(as of 2004) and age is the number of years the firm
has on CompStat with the non-missing stock price. Greater the SA index, the higher level of
financial constraints. Therefore, In this paper, we applied this new measurement of financial

constraints to check whether the company’s marginal value of cash still differs under different
financial constraints.

4. Empirical Research
4.1. Summary Statistics on the Whole Sample
In this paper, we used the Stata software to perform the descriptive statistical
analysis over 70,283 observations of the entire sample. The results are shown in table 2.
From this table, we can see that the median firm has -5.53% I year excess abnormal return.
However, the average firm has a slightly positive 3.76 % 1-year abnormal return, suggesting
that the stock abnormal return is right skewed. The average level of corporate cash holdings
accounts for 15.9% of the market value and the average level of leverage is 19.89%, which
shows that the US firms over-reliance on the debt financing. Since the mean and median of
the corporate earnings are both positive, we can know that there is an upward trend of the
average level of corporate earnings.

[ Insert table 2 here]

4.2 Regression Results on The Whole Sample

Table 3 shows the regression results on the whole sample. From column I, we can see
that the coefficient on changes in cash holdings is 1.621 and this number is significant at 1%
level. This number is the marginal value of cash that the equity investors gave. When
introduced two interaction terms, we can see that the coefficient on changes in cash holdings
increased to 2.833 and it also significant at 1% level. Therefore, we can know that the
corporate cash holdings and capital structure will affect the marginal value of cash.
Even though we extend our data time frames, the coefficient on the interaction terms
Ct-1*ΔCi,t is still significantly negative at 1% level, which verified Faulkender and Wang’s
(2006) first hypothesis, that is, the marginal value of cash will decrease as the level of firm’s
cash positions increases. Therefore, when the company does not hold or only hold a small
amount of cash, they will face a high probability of external financing. Thus, the marginal
value of cash is higher compared to cash-rich firms. Also, consistent with Faulkender and
Wang’s (2006) second hypothesis, the regression coefficient on the interaction terms Lt*ΔCt
is also significantly negative at 1% level. This fact tells us that the marginal value of cash will
decrease as the level of leverage increases. Since the default risks increases in the level of
leverage, from shareholders perspectives, the value of one additional dollar of cash thus will
be lower.

[Inser table 3 here]

4.3 Empirical Results Under Financial Constraints
Table 4 listed different regression results under various financial constraints
grouping method. After considering the effects of level of cash holdings and financial
leverages, the marginal value of cash for constrained and unconstrained groups is
consistent with the assumption three, that is, the marginal value of cash for the constrained
group is higher than the unconstrained group. The coefficients of the interaction term Ct1*ΔCt and Lt* ΔCt are basically the same as the results of table 3. They are both
significantly negative at 1% level. Also, based on the size criterion, the marginal value of
cash of a mean firm that is financially constrained equals $2.415 (= $2.855+(- $1.025*$
0.2304663)+(-$1.246* $ 0.1631573)), while this value only equals $1.99 (= 2.601+(0.44*0.1701952)+(-2.109*0.263523) ) for unconstrained firms. For other two criterion, the
marginal value of cash is $2.301 versus $1.854 under payout criterion and $2.411 versus
$1.6386 under SA index criterion. As we can see, no matter we use the single indicator (size
or payout ratio) or the composite indicator (Size-Age index) to measure financial
constraints, the marginal value of cash of financially constrained firm is significantly higher
than unconstrained ones.

[insert table 4 here]

4.4 Robustness Test
According to Faulkender and Wang, increases in the value of equity due to cash
increments should only consider the portions of changes in cash that is unexpected. Thus, we
need to subtract the expected changes in cash from our previous dependent variables and
only use the unexpected portion to run our regression analysis. Borrowed the ideas from
Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Almeida et al. (2004), we constructed three methods to
measure the unexpected changes in cash.
First, we subtract average change in cash in the benchmark portfolios over fiscal year
to get our unexpected changes in cash. Second, followed Almeida et al., we regressed
changes in cash holding on firm size, cash flow (= (IB+DP-DVP-DVC )/AT), and Q (market
value /book value of assets). We captured the residuals to get our unexpected changes in
cash. In the end, the last method is similar to the second one, but only add additional four
variables, that is, “capital expenditures, acquisitions, changes in non-cash net working
capital, and changes in short-term debt.” The following are the new sample results by using
the alternative measurement of changes in unexpected cash. From table 5, we can see that
the financial leverages and the corporates ’cash holdings still have negative influences on
the marginal value of cash and all these numbers are significant at 1% level. Therefore, the
robustness of the regression coefficient proves that Faulkender and Wang’s hypothesis and
results still valid.

[insert table 5 in here]

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of the corporate capital structure have on the
marginal value of cash. By replicating Faulkner and Wang’s article, we found that the
marginal value of cash to the shareholders in the mean firm is 2.32. Also, consistent with
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) findings, we found that “the marginal value of cash decreases
with large cash holdings, higher leverages , and better access to capital markets. ” (Faulkender
and Wang,2006)
Form all these results, we can also know that because of the expensive transaction
costs and asymmetry problems exist in the external financing process, equity shareholders
will give a higher value evaluation to companies with strong liquidity. However, the marginal
value of cash will decreases as the cash positions increases. Therefore, the company's level
of cash holdings should have a limit. Too much cash holdings will cause free cash flow agency
problems. In addition, because the company’s capital structure affects the distribution of the
company’s profits between the equity shareholders and the debt holders, from shareholders
perspective, the marginal value of cash will also decrease with higher financial leverages.
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